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Since the work of Pollak and Wales (19i9), it is well-known that demand data
are insufficient to identify a household cost function. Hence additional information
is required. For that purpose I propose to employ direct measurement of feelings
of well-being, elicited in surveys.
In the paper I formally establish the connection between subjective measures
and the cost tunction underlying the AID system. The subjective measures fully
identify cost functions and the expenditure data do this paztly. This makes it
possible to test the null hypothesis that both types of data are consistent with one
another, i.e. that they measure the same thing. I use two separate data sets to
set up a test of this equivalence. The outcomes are somewhat mixed, but can be
seen to lend support to the hypothesis. Finally, I discuss some implications of the
outcomes.
~ Presidential address delivered at the seventh annual meeting of the European Society for Population
Economics, June 2-5, Budapest, Hungazy. A first version was presented at the meetings of the Allied
Social Sciences Associations, Anaheim California, January 5-7, 1993. The author thanks Rob Alesaie
for help with the data, and the Netherlands Central Buresu ofStatistics for their permission to use the
data.Contents
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Household cost functions (and equivalence scales) can have many purposes and many
underlying assumptions, as for instance stressed by Browning (1993). 2 In this paper I
am concerned with the question how household cost ïunctiona depend on the composition
of a household. Traditionally, a question like this is answered by the incorporation of
demographic factors in demand systems. As has been argued by Pollak and Wales (1979)
one cannot fully identify household cost functions from demand data alone. Although
this is not a problem in all cases, e.g. if one only wants to use a household cost function
as a representation of preferences from which to derive demand equationa, it does pose
problems if one wants to use cost functions in applied welfare analysis.
The most obvious solution to an identification problem is to invoke additional infor-
mation. It can be argued that, rather than employing data on consumption expenditures,
a household's cost function can also be measured, and with less effort, by asking respon-
dents to a survey subjective questions about money amounts needed to attain a certain
welfare level. This approach has been adopted by a li~nited number of authors includ-
ing I{apteyn and Van Praag (1976), Kapteyn, I{ooreman, Willemse (1988), Hagenaars
(1986), Van Praag and Van der Sar (1988), Dubnoff (1979), Vaughan (1984), Danziger,
Van der Gaag, Taussig, Smolensky (1984), Colasanto, I{apteyn, Van der Gaag (1984),
De Vos and Garner (1991). Although in my opinion this dinect measurement has proven
to work very well and to yield sensible results, it is fair to say that the profession of
economists has generally ignored the direct approach.
I am not entirely sure why this is. On the basis of my own discussions with other
economists (including discussants at conferences and referees for journals) I would con-
jecture that most economists simply do not believe what people say. They feel that
the questions asked to respondents are too difficult or abstract to yield sensible an-
swers. Hence they cannot believe that what people say reflects preferences in the same
way that observed choice behavior does. And if responses to questions do not measure
the same thing as observed behavior then direct measurement becomes irnelevant for
empirical economics. This impression is probably reinforced by the feeling that direct
measurement yields results that appear different than outcomes obtained through de-
tnand analysis (which I will henceforth refet to as indirect measunement or the revealed
preference approach).
The purpose of this paper is to formally test whether direct and indirect measurement
of cost functions are equivalent, i.e. whether the two approaches measure the same
concept. This is important for various reasons. In the first place direct measurement
is much simpler than indirect measurement and hence more cost effective. So if we
can accept the hypothesis that both modes of ineasurement measure the same thing,
empirical analysis may be greatly facilitated. Secondly, the direct approach does not
suffer from the same identification problem as the indirect approach. Hence if we can
accept equivalence, we also solve a fundamental problem that has been bugging applied
welfare analysis. In the third place, as will become clear below, combination of indirect
and direct approaches yields new possibilities for the detection of misspecification in
empirical models and solution of the ensuing problems.
ZSee also Nelson (1993) fot a historical and philosophical account2
For a start, I will present an example in Section 2 illustrating the identification prob-
lem inherent in the revealed pre[erence approach. In Section 3 I will provide a brief
discussion of the informational requirements for identification. In Section 4 I will intro-
duce the cost function of the Almost Ideal Demand System, which will serve as the main
vehicle for setting up an empirical test. There I also discuss indirect measurement. In
Section 5 direct measurement of the same cost function is described. In Sections 6 and
7 I develop the (simple) econometric framework that will allow for a test of equivalence
of direct and indirect measurement. In Section 8 the outcomes of the test are presented.
A discussion of the results and their implications follows in Section 9.
2 Underidentification of cost functions; an example





U~(q,f) - ~Q;ln(9~-a~)f Éf
~-i
where
q :- k-vector of goods
f:- vector oí household characteristics
a;,,0; :- parameters, which may depend on f
e :- parameter vector
Maximiration of either of these functions with respect to q, subject to a linear budget
constraint yields the following demand functions:
k
P~9; - P~a; ~ Q;(~ -~ Plai),i- 1,... , k (2.3)
where
p; .- prices,i - 1,...,k
x :- total expenditures
The reason why the utility functions U and U' yield the same demand functions is
obvious. U' is equal to the log of U plus a constant Q'f. Hence, if U reaches a maximum,
so does U'.
By substituting the demand equations into the utility function we can easily dervive
the cost functions associated with U and U'. They are, respectively:
~k7 p, k
c(u,P,f) - u.ii ~P,~ }~P;a.
t-r Q~ ~-i
k p~ k
c~(u~,R!) - e"~. ~ ~p~ ~ .e-`~~ -~ ~ pta; (2.5)
,-r p ~-ri
If denrancl data arc available one can estimate all parameters in the demand eyuation
(2.3). If these pararneters depend on household characteristics then the parameters
appearing in the relation between the demand parameters and household characteristics
ran be cstimated as well. As indicated above, I will refer to this way of ineasurernent of
nrrd. f~nrrl.irrn parnniotr~rn an inrlirrrl nrrrt.yurrmrnl ur rrr~rrrlrvl ptrfrrwnrw urcnnurrnrrul.
Clcarly, the pararneter vector r in ('L.5) cannot be ideutified írorn Lhe dernand eyuation,
because e does not appear in the demand equation. Nor is it possible to tell wether c or
c' is the correct cost function.
Although I have chosen to illustrate the identification problem by means of an ex-
ample, it should be clear that the problem is perfectly general. Dcmand data alone can
never identify a household cost function completely.
3 Informational requirements
"1'he fact that dema.nd data are not sufficient to identify a cost function completely was
(irst noted by Pollak and Wales (1979), and later reiterated by Lewbel (1989), Fisher
(1987), Blackorby and Donaldson (1988), Pashardes (1992), and others. Whenever one
faces an identification problem, there are threo basic choices. The first is to accept the
problr~in a.ii~l to t,ry and livo wil.h it. 'I'his iurlndr~s aii at.lc~iupl. to ~r~e what can st.ill br-
salvaged from the wreckage. 'Phe second approach is to make arbitrary assumptions that
(seemingly) make the problem go away. The third approach is to invoke additional in-
formation. I will brieHy discuss these three approaches in the present. context, borrowing
Creely frorn Blundell and Lewbel (1991).
~ Tr~ying to livc zoith it. Blundell and Lewbel (1991) prove a beautiful lemma which
says that within a given price regime any equivalence scale (i.e. the cost of living
of one household relative to another) is consistent with observed demand. That
is, r~yniv:rlence scales an~ nut idcul.i(ir~d. AI thr~ satue Lintr~ t.he evulution of Lhr~tir~
eyuivalence scales with changes in the price regime is fully identified. One can
paraphrase this by saying that we can fully identify the changes in something that
we cannot see. I doubt if there are ma.ny contexts in which such information is
ntir~lltl.
~ ArGitrary assumptions. If no extra informa.tion is invoked (see below), any as-
sumption that solves the identification problem is by definition arbitrary. Many
assumptions have been made in the literature either implicitly of explicitly. A
popular assumption has been the Inrlependence oJ F3ase (IB) assumption 3, which
stipulates that the ratio of cost functions for two households is independent of
the level of utility at which the cost functions are evaluated. Although IB places
testable restrictions on observable demands, acceptance of these restrictions does
noL solvc t.he idc,nti(icaf,iou prublcm cotnpletoly. 'l'his can be illustratcd by thc
L.E.S. example in the previous section. [B implies for both (2.4) and (2.5) that
the parameters a; have to be eyual to zero. One can see immediately from (2.3)
that this is a testable hypothesis. However, if this hypothesis is accepted by the
3or equivalence scale exactness, as it is denoted by Blackorby and Donaldson (1988)4
data, and if we are therefore willing to maintain that the parametera a; are zero,
this dces not imply that equivalence scales can be identified. There is still no way
to choose between (2.4) and (2.5). We have to make the additional, untestable,
assumption t,hat all monotonic transformations of u that are allowed in (2.4) do
not involve household composition. In other words, in (2.5) the vector e has to be
identically equal to zero. Clearly in that case (2.4) and (2.5) will yield identical
equivalence scales.
So, acceptance of IB does not solve our problems. On the other hand if IB is
rejected then even the additional assumption that u is uniquely determined up to
monotonic transformations not involving household composition, does not deter-
mine equivalence scales uniquely. It is worthwile therefore to note that tests of IB
by Blundell and Lewbel (1991) and by Pashardes (1992) indicate sound rejection.
One can also formulate [B " in terms of dijjerences of cost functions rather than
ratios, cf. Blackorby and Donaldson (]993). In that case the difference between
cost Cunctions of different households should not depend on utility. In the L.E.S.
example one can see that IB in this sense will hold for (2.4) if the Q; do not depend
on household composition. The difference in cost of two households h and r say is
then simply:
k
~pi(aih - air) (í3.1)
i-1
where the subscripts h and r indicate depence of the parameters on the compostion
of the households h and r. This outcome remains unaffected if we assume once
again that u is uniquely determined up to a monotonic transformation not involving
household composition. In other words in (2.5) the vector e has to be identically
equal to zero. 5
'I'he IB assumption is by no means the only assumption that can be made to avoid
the identification problem. But all assumptions have in common that they are
arbitrary if we do not invoke additional informat.ion.
~ Additional informatinn Blundell and Lewbel mention two types of additional in-
formation one could conceive of. The first type is to have observations on revealed
preference for household compositions. Although one can conceive of such an ap-
proach in principle, it certainly stretches one's imagination as to how this would
have to be implemented in practice. The other possibility they mention is the use
of direct questions on household cost functions. And that is the approach I want
to pursue in the rest of this paper.
~or exactneas
bí ignore the pathological case that all Q; are zero. In that case the utility function ia a conatant.5
4 The cost function of the Almost Ideal Demand
System
For concreteness the rest oí the analysis will be done for a specific choice of funetional
form. Consider the formula for a PIGLOG cost function, cf. Muellbauer (1975):
ln(c(u,P)) - a(P) t b(P)u, (4.1)
where p is a vector of prices and a(p) and b(p) are functions of prices. Furthermore,
let us specialize the PIGLOG formulation to the Almost Ideal Demand specification of
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) and define
a(P) - ao -4- ~ akln(Pk) f 2~~?'k~ln(Pk)ln(Pi) (4.2)
k k 1
b(P) - ~o ~ Pkk (4.3)
k
where the parameters ak, ryk~, Qk have to satisfy well-known homogeneity restrictions.
'l'his givrs rise to demand equations of the form:
wt - a~ f~7~rln(Pi) t Q~[in(x) - a(P)~, (4.4)
i
where w; is the budget share of the i-th commodity, i- 1, . .., I; x is total expenditures.
The paraineters in the demand system, and hence the parameters of the cost function,
can be estimated if one has data available on the consumption of households under a
sufficiently rich variation in prices. That is, in this way the parameters are measured
indirectly, as defined in Section 2.
Clearly, for the cost function (4.1) to satisfy IB in a relative form the parameters in
b(p) should not depend on household composition. This is a testable proposition. If
IB is satisfied equivalence scales would be identified from demand data if furthermore
u would be determined up to monotonic transformations not depending on household
composition. And, as with the L.E.S. example, there is no way of knowing whether this
is true without additional information. It is to such additional information that I now
turn.
5 Direct measurement
In the lite,rature around the so-called individual welfare function of income (WFI)
spawned by Van Praag (1968), much of the empirical analysis is based on the answers
to the following question:
Which after tax income would you in your circumstances consider to be
very bad? And bad? Insufficient? Sufficient? Good? Very good?







IC one accepts the verbal qualifications "good", "sufBcient", "bad", etc. as indications
of utility levels the IEQ measures a cost function directly. For, the answers then provide
for each of the utility levels the amount of money required to attain that utility level.
Since the preamble states that answers have to be given "in your circumstances" the
cost function is measured conditional on these circumstances. There is of course some
ambiguity as to what these circumstances are, but one would expect family composition
to be one of them.
In the WFI-literature a specific functional form for the cost function is assumed,
corresponding to an indirect utility function that has a lognormal shape A(.; {~, o). To
measure the parameters p and o of the lognormal utility function for a given respondent
it is commonly assumed that the verbal qualifications in the IEQ can be transformed
into numbers, say e;,i - 1,...,6, between zero and one. These numbers partition the
[0,1] intcrval in equal intervals, i.e. e; -(2i - I)~12. In other words, the label "very
bad" is associated with e~ - 1~12, the label "bad" with e2 - 3~12, etc. If we denote
the answers given by respondent by z;, i- 1,...6, then by assumption the answers satisfy
approximately
!n(z; - p
N(!n(z;);p,o) - N~ 0,1 - e;,i - 1,...,6 (5.1)
` o
T'his implies that approximately,
ln(z;) -te -
N-'(e;;t), 1),i - 1,...,6 (5.2)
Q
Adding an error term to allow for measurement and rounding errors in the answers of
a respondeut, the parameters p and o of an individual can now by estimated by the
following regression:
ln(z~) - Ir -f QN-1(e~; ~,1) f et, (5.3)
Further details are for instance given in Van Praag (1971) and Van Praag and Kapteyn
(1973). Since this mode of ineasurement was introduced, various tests of the underlying
assumptions have been carried out, including the equal interval assumption and lognor-
mality, see, e.g., Antonides, Kapteyn, Wansbeek (1980), Van Herwaarden and Kapteyn
(1981), Buyze (1982), Van Praag (1991). The outcomes of these tests is not uniformly
supportive of the underlying assumptions, but they indicate their approximate validity.
Since by assumption N-~(e;; 0,1) is nothing else than a positive monotonic transfor-
mation of a utility level, and since there is no presumption that p and a do not depend
on prices, we might as we11 write (5.3) as
ln(z;) - P(P) f~(P)ut t e;, (5.4)7
where u; - N-r(e;;0, 1). Comparing this to the PIGLOG cost function given by (4.1),
suggests that the IEQ may be seen to measure a PIGLOG cost function by means of
direct questions rather than through observation of behavior.
Similarly the analogy of (4.1) and (5.4) suggests that
P(P) -~o f~ akln(Pk) f 2~~7kiln(Pk)In(Pr) (5.5)
k k !
o(P) - i~o ~ Pk` (5.6)
k
Since p and o can be measured per individual, one could estimate the parameters on
the right hand side of (5.5) and (5.6) by regressing {~ and v on the functions of prices on
Lhe right hand side of (5.5) and (5.6). So this then amounts to the direct measurement
of the parameters of the AID cost function.
So we now have two ways to measure the parameters of the AIDS, namely through the
observation of demand (i.e. through revealed preíerence) or through direct measurement.
IL is this fact that allows us to test in principle whether the direct measurement and the
revealed preference approach measure the same thing.
6 Econometric implications
There are at least two reasons why testing for the equivalence of the direct a.nd the
indirect approach is less straightforward than a comparison of (4.4) and (5.5)-(5.6) would
suggest. The first reason is that the models are not complete; most likely preferences
vary across households 6. Neglect of such variation may bias the test. A second reason
is that no data sets exist that permit both the estimation of the demand system and the
measurement of WFIs.
Turning to the first problem, I assume that the following simple equation provides a
suf6ciently accurate description of the variation of preferences across households.
~o.,, - óo -f~ b~f~ -1- ~n, (6.1)
where n now indexes the household, ao,,, is simply cro as occurring in (4.2), but with an
index n to indicate that it may vary across households. 6o and b are parameters, f„ is a
vector of household characteristics for household n; ~„ represents all other factors that
rnay inftuence the household's preferences. These factors may include reference group
effects, habit formation, random effects, etc.
Let us rewrite (4.4) by indexing all variables by n and adding an i.i.d. error term u,,;,
and by replacing a(p) by a„(p), where a„(p) is defined according to (4.2), but with ~o
replaced by ao,,,. So we obtain:
w~~ - ~~ ~- ~7~~(n(Pn~) } A~~fn(x) - an(P)~ t un„ (6.2)
i
s!n the present set-up t ignore the poasibility that households are not homogeneous decision making
units. Thus 1 assume that both observed consumption behavior and answera to the IEQ either reflect
household pre(erencea or the pre(erences ofthe dictatorin the household.Similarly, we replace (5.5) by
1
Irn - ao,n -~ ~akln(Pnk) f 2 ~~7k~ln(Pnk)!n(Pnt) ~- vn - an(P) f vn (6.3)
k k 1
with vn an error term, representing for instance measurement error in pn.
It is worth commenting on the effect of the variable r;n implicit in an(p). First of all
we should note that if r;n is not fully specified this introduces bias in the estimates of the
parameters of the two equations above, unless we could claim that the omitted factors do
not correlate with the included explanatory variables. In general the bias will be different
in the two equations and hence the direct and the indirect approach to measurement of
cost functions yield different outcomes. The only way to avoid the omitted variable bias
is to have a complete specification of all factors influencing preferences. With respect
to the explanation of variation in the welfare parameters ~i and v across households
numerous papers have been written documenting these various influences. See, e.g.,
Kapteyn, Van de Geer, Van de Stadt ( 1985) or Hagenaars ( 1986). The literature on
taste shifting in demand systems is relatively less voluminous, but also here the evidence
points at significant effects. See, e.g., Alessie and Kapteyn (1991) for evidence that in
the AID system demographic effects, habit formation, and reference group effects all
play a role. This evidence also suggests that ~ will be correlated with most if not all
explanatory variables in a demand system like ( 4.4). This strengthens the observation
t.hat omission of relevant factors will bias estimates.
So how can we devise a test of the equivalence of direct and indirect measurement that
is not affected by this omitted variable bias? Note that under the adopted formulation
the null hypothesis of equivalence of direct and indirect measurement implies that
wnt f Q~irn - a~ f~7;!!n(Pnj) f Qtln(~n) f un~ f Qtvn (6.4)
i
A test of the null can now take the form of adding fn and bilinear functions of log-prices
to the right hand side of (6.4) and testing for significance of their coeficients. For later
treatment it is useful to consider a particular alternative hypothesis, namely that the
cyuation for pn reads
Irn - oó.n { ~ akln(Pnk) } 1 L L~ yklln(Pnk)!n (Pnf) f vn (6.5)
k 2 k !
and
~ó,n - óó f ó~ f f~n (6.6)
In other words, the functional form is the same as under the null, but the parameters
are different. This leads to
wnr -F Q~l~n - ar -~ QtÍó- óo) f ~(7t~ f Qt(a~ - ai)~ln(Pni) f Qrln(xn)
i
~Q;(b' - b)'In t 2Q; ~~(7k~ - 1'kt)!n(Pnk)!n(P nf) } uni fQ;vn (s.7)9
hi obvious notation this can be written with "reduced form coefficients" as
wn~ ~- n4.~l~n -~o.r f~ nr,~~fn(Pn~) f~zfn
~
-F ~ ~ ~s.kiln(Pnk)!n(Pni) f ~4.~In(~n) } un~ t ~4.tvn (6.8)
k 1
Under the null, we have that az - 0 and a3,k~ - 0. So if data on all variables in (6.8)
were available, we could simply run a regression and apply F- or t-tests to test the null.
Since, as mentioned above, no single data set is available containing all variables in (6.8)
we have to combine different samples.
? Combining samples
Two datasets are available. The first one is a consumer expenditure panel which has
run from April 1984 through September 1987~. This panel allows for the estimation
of a demand system, including demographics, using monthly observations, but does not
allow for the measurement of WFIs. Thc second dataset is a household panels measuring
income, labor market status, demographics, and the like. Also, WFIs are measured. The
interviews have taken place in October 1984, October 1985 and October 1986. I will refer
to the first panel as the CEP (consumer expenditure panel) and to the second panel as
the SEP (socio-economic panel).
In the empirical work I shall consider only two goods, rfoodn and "otherr. Monthly
price indices can be constructed from official statistics. In view of the fact that only
two commodities are considered and given the homogeneity restrictions on coefficients
in the AID system, only the relative price index of "food" relative to rothern enters the
demand system. Also, we only have to consider one equation írom the system, as the
other follows from adding up. This allows us to drop the subscript i and to write (6.8)
a.S
uin -f ~4lzn - ~o -F ir~In(Pn) -b ~2fn i- ~s~ln(Pn)~z f ~4fn(~n) 1- un f zr4vn (7.1)
In the estimation of equation (7.1) I follow the recent literature on the combination
of samples, see, e.g., Arellano and Meghir ( 1991), Angrist and Krueger (1992), Lusardi
(1993). Simplify equation ( 7.1) even further by writing it in matrix format as
w f pa4 - X~B f.~za4 f e, (7.2)
where JC~ is a matrix containing a column of ones plus the observations on the first three
variables on the right hand side of (7.1 and .l2 is a vector containing the obervations on
log-expenditures. The parameter vector 0 is defined as B-(ao, ~i, nz, ~a)~.
If all variables were observed for all households, and if Z were a matrix of valid
instru~nents 9 one would typically estimate the parameters of interest by constructing
~This is the so-called Intomart consumer index; the data uaed here were prepared by Pim Adang
aThis is the so-called socio-economic panel run by the Netherlands Central Bureau o( Statiatics. In
this paper 1 use an extract (rom the data constructed by Alessie, Kapteyn, and Melenberg (1992)
yTotal expenditures are probably not atatistically exogenous, and hence instrumental variable esti-
mation is required.10
the vector
Z'(w f prr4 - X~B - Xza4) (7.3)
;uul minilnizing ita Icngth with respect to rr4 and 0 in some appropriatc rnetric.
The elements of Xr are observed for both samples, but the elements of X2 and w
are only observed for the CEP, whereas the elements of ~r are only observed for the
SEP. Let Z~ be a matrix of instruments observed for the CEP sample and let Z, contain
observations on the same instruments for the SEP sample. If both samples can be
considered to be drawings from the same population then consistent estimation of the
parameters can take place by minimizing the length of the following vector:
NcZ~rof NDZ~{rrr,r- NZ'X~~- ~. Z~Xzr~a, (7.4)
where '!, without subscript a.nd Xr stands for the matrix of instruments and variables
for both samples combined. N~ is the number of observations in the CEP and N, is
the nurnher of observations in the SEP, N- N,. f N,. The minimization problem
I'.111 I11' !:1rIV1'II III il Vt'1'Y HIIIIIIII' WlIV. I IIIN r-illl I)f' NIV'll iIN lf1IIl11VN, I~I'lllll' t.Ill' VI`t~tl)r
~-( N'~2t' -N,C.1)' and the vector z -( N w',0)'. 'I'hen we can rewrite the above vector
as follows:
NZ'(z - Xle - yaa), (7.5)
which we recognize as the vector that would be minimized if we would estimate the
following model by instrurnental variables:
1 1~'e } 1 y~4 } error (7.6)
N~ - N~ N
'Che only thing that remains to be done for eíficient estimation is to derive the asymptotic
variauce covariance matrix of the crror. 'fhis is done in the Appendix. With this
covariance matrix in hand one can apply generalized least squares.
8 Empirical results
P'or 91 households in the CEP observations are available for all 42 months that the
panel has been in existence. Thus we have 3822 observations in total. The balanced
panel extracted from the SEP has 1328 households.'o Since three waves are used in
the empirical analysis, we have 3984 observations. At first sight, issues of selectivity and
individual and time effects wouW appear to complicate the analyeis. However, the set-up
of model (6.4) essentially wipes out all such elfects. 'r Hence we use the observations as
if they are independent, conditional on the exogenous variables in the model.
(7nly .r lilnited nurnber of variables can he used as instruments, slnce the definition
uf varinbleN acrosN sarnples appears to clilfer widely. It turns out that only degree of
'oThis number ia much lower than would be possible, since the SEP covers approximately 5,000
households. However in Alessie, Kapteyn, Melenberg a severe selection has been made, aince extensive
infonnatiou on households' reCerence groups had to be available. For simplicity I have not tried to
rnnstruct a biqger sample.
1113u1., srr thc ucxt section11
urbanization and province ot residence are defined in identical ways for the two samples.
For the rest I consider prices and household composition as exogenous, so these yield
valid instruments as well. The influence of household composition has been modelled in
an extremely simple way, namely as the log of the number of family members. This may
alrpca.r tou Irrimitivc, but it. does not, bias thc te~st under the null. For, any misspc~cifi-
c.r,l.iun in I,hc rnodclling of thc iufluencc of fanrily composition will bo absorbcd by thc
variable ~„ in (6.1), which dces not appear in the test.
In Table 1 I present four sets of results. In the first column the results of estimating
a food share equation analogous to (6.2) are presented. hi the second column estimates
are given obtained by estimating eyuation (7.6) by OLS. In the third and fourth column
I Irn~r~nl Lhe esl.iniat.es ohtaiuerl hy thc IV alrfiroach out.lincd above. The differencc
hrd.wcrn Lhc latt~~r Lwu colnninv lir~4 iii Lh~~ clr~linil iun uf insl i inucnl.s. In thr thirvl colunrn
urbanízation degree has been defined as a set of six binary variables with province a
variablc with domain I,..., 11. hr the fourth column urbanization degree has been de-
fined iclcntica.lly, but pro~.incc has now been defined as a set of eleven binary variables.
Allhont;h bot.h rledinitions of instnuncnt.s woiilcl a.ppear to be valid choiccs, one woulel
r,xpect thc latter set of instnnnents Lo be supcrior in terms of Lhe asymptotic efficiency
of the resulting estimators.
'I'AI3LG 3. f~SCIMA'1'f?S FUR 'I'llltl.G Sf'I~;CI['1CA'1'IONS




















































In view oF the purpose of this paper, the most striking aspect of Table 1 is that the
c~rri:~Ll~~ lr~( ~.~), whir h i, hi~,lily sip;ni(irant, iu thc fnod .h:rm eqnal,ion anrl also cornc, oul.
lriglrly siguificant wheu estimating (7.6) witlr ULS becomes totall,y insignificant when
estimating the model by means of IV, as in the third column. In the fourth column12
however, with the use of the more ef6cient instruments, the coefficient of In(fs) is once
again highly significant though smaller in absolute value than with OLS.
It should be noted furthermore that the variable ln~(p) remains significant in both
IV-columns, whereas according to (6.4) this variable should become insignificant as well.
Although this is at variance with the null as formulated so far, it is easy to think of a
cost function which would be compatible with a significant In~(p) variable. That would
still be a PIGLOG cost function but with a function a(p) defined as a cubic polynomial
in log-prices rather than as a yuadratic (cf. (4.2) ):
a(il) ~- ~O ~~ Qkln(pk) ~ ;~ L
L..~7k11T1(pk)lti(pl) ~ 3 L. L L~k1mlTt(pk)In(pl)In(pm)
k k 1 k 1 m
(8.1)
'i'his cost function would also imply the presence of ln3(p) in the foodshare equation.
1 have estimated the foodshare eyuation as in column one of Table 1, but with !rz3(p)
included. It turns out that the fit of the equation does not change. The reason for this
is simply that in the present data set the variables ln(p), !n2(p) and ln3(p) are highly
collinear: A regression of In3(p) on In(p) and hxZ(p) yields an R~ equal to 0.994. ln fact
the fit of the foodshare equation is identical whether we include !n(p) and In2(p) or In(p)
and ln3(P).
In sum, we find that we can formulate a specification of the cost function such that
according to one set of instruments the null hypothesis that direct and indirect mea-
surement are equivalent would pass the test, whereas a different (more efficient) set of
instruments yields the conclusion that the two modes of ineasurement are not equivalent,
although the size of the coefficient of log-family size in column four suggests that the
null hypothesis may be reasonably close to the truth.
9 Discussion
The empirical analysis has been based on a rather simple model. This leads to two
sorts of considerations. First of all, under the null, misspecification due to an overly
simplistic set-up, e.g. the representation of family composition merely by the log of
family size, is absorbed by the variable ~„ in (6.1) and hence should not bias the test of
the null.
A second kind of consideration is that if the model chosen is too simplistic, then this
misspecification will tend to be picked up by variables a.dded to the model, even if these
variables do not properly belong to the model. In other words one tends to obtain too
many significant variables. 5ince my test is based on precisely the addition of variables
to an cquation that, under the null should not be there, the test would seem to be biased
against the null. An example of a likely source of misspecification is the disregard of
issues oí selectivity and serial correlation; to the extent that these enter the equations
through t.he error term in (6.1), they are wiped out by the combination of the equations
(6.2) and (6.3) into (6.4). To the extent that selectivity and serial cocrelation affect the
eyuations in a different way, one would expect the model (6.4) to be misspecified. This
misspecification may then be picked up by the variable ln( Js), and hence the test will be13
biased against the null. This would then explain the significant coefficient in the fourth
cul~nnn ~,f 'I':~I,IP I .
Altogether then the evidence appears to be a bit mixed. Formally, the null is rejected,
but the cstimated coefficient of ln(fs) is not very large. Given the various sources of
misspecification mentioned this is about what one would expect if the null were true.
Hence, although the issue of equivalence of direct and indirect measurement of cost
functions has not been settled by the simple test I have proposed here, further research
into the hypothesis seems justified. Among other things, one may consider more complex
specifications than (6.1)
An important aspect of the tPSt applied here, is that it tries to deal with omitted
variables. It is readily seen that omitted variables lead to different biases in a demand
equation than in for instance (6.3). As noted in Section 6, this implies that equivalence
scales dcrived from demand systems will be different from scales derived from subjective
measures. These differences may simply point to misspecification rather than to genuine
differences between direct and indirect measurement.~Z
One should also note that equivalence scales show enormous variation across studies
based solely on demand data, cf. Browning (1992). This variation itself may point to
misspPrification in thP modPls considered '3. h1ore importantly, since all equivalence
~c'a1,:, La.,r~l un flrm~tnd data ~;nlfPr fruiu t.hP i,lrnl.ific'al.iun problriu a.llndcd tu iu Scv~l,iun
'~, one ~nay claitn that, the scales obtained by various authors are inherently arbitrary.
I~ecall the Lemma proven by Blundell and Lewbel (1991), quoted in Section 3 above.
Imagine that the null hypothesis put forward in this paper were accepted as being
true, then this would have a number of consequences. First of all it would suggest that
t.hP 11A.1't.U'lllar rl'IIrPHPUI.at.iun uf LhP ntilif,,y fiuict.ion adopl,Pd hrrP ia adPqllaLP, HPn(.P,
if one were able to fully specify the AIU syste~n (with third order terms in log-prices,
and not omitting relevant variables) equivalence scales could be estimated that are not
arbitrary. Secondly, however, the outcomes then also validate the direct measurement
approach. This approach requires much less data than a revealed preference approach.
So, once again, if one is able to fully specify a model for tc, or better still a model for
E~ and o jointly, equivalence scales follow. Various a,t.tempts to specify such a complete
model have been made. See, e.g., Kapteyn (1977), I[apteyn, Wansbeek, Buyze (1980),
Kapteyn, Van de Geer, Van de Stadt (1985), Kapteyn and Wansbeek (1985).
Since one can never be sure that a model is fully specified, the joint use of direct
ineasurement and revealed preference allows for tests of specification that would not
otherwise exist. In certain cases one can use the two different measurements to solve
misspecification problems in a similar vein as in general latent variables models, see, e.g.,
Aigner et al. (1984).
Fourtl~ly, it opens up new possibilitics for identification. For example, if data seríes
on consumption by households are too short to estimate all parameters in a demand
syst.em the availability of subjective measures, like p, may help to identify parameters.
IZThis is not to say U,at demand systems and subjective measures will only suRer from similar
sources of misspecification. In Kapteyn, Kooreman, Wíllemse (1988) specific methodologica! issues in
the application of subjective measures are being discussed. Their correction method has been uaed to
construct the values for u in the current data set.
13if only because the models cannot alI be true at the same time14
A Appendix
In orde.r to obtain asymptotically efficient estimators of the parameters of interest
(and hence a powerful test of the null), the length of the vectot
g - ~`Z~w -f NeZ.f~~, - NZ'Xie - NcZ~X2cA4), (A.1)
(cf. 7.4) has to be minimized in the appropriate metric, i.e. the inverse of the asymptotic
varian~ ~- ~ uvariance~ matrix of the ve.ctor g, whcrr for all parametPrs true vahies havf. bcwn
iiiscrteeL An asyn~ptotically equivaleut procedur~~ is to replace true parameter values by
consistent estimates. These consistent estimates are obtained by minimizing g in the
unit metric.
The derivat.ion of the asymptotic variance covariance matrix of g is straightforward.
I~~,r a,t;~rt. wr aYSUnie Lhat, ohse.rvat.ions in two di(ferrnt samples are mutually indepen-
,li,nl,. Wo can write
9- 9~ f g, -[N~Z~tn - NZ~Xi~e - ~~Z~-~z~~4)] f[N~ Z.F~~4 - NZ;Xi,B], (A.2)
in obvious notation. Denote the asymptotic variance covariance matrices of g~ and g,
by ~~ a.nd d', respectively. That is, 4';, i- c, s is defined as the variance covariance
inatrix of the limiting distribution of ~g; for N; -a oo. Furthermore, let p; be the
limit for N -~ o0 of N , i- c, s. Let the asymptotic variance covariance matrix ~ of g
be defined analogously to those of g~ and g„ but with N~ or N, replaced by N. Then the
asymptotic variance covariance matrix of g is p4'~ ~ p ~ 4i,. There is no need to derive
4'~ and d', explicitly, one only needs to find consistent estimators that can be used in
estimation. Define the vectors
gci - Zd(ti'ci - r,'~lcie -'~2ci~4) - ZcieCE
9si - Z,i(ilei~4 - -N Xiaie) - Z ,ie,i,
(A.3)
(A.4)
whcre '1,~; is the i-th row of 'L~, .~~~;, XZ~;, Z,;, X~,; are defined aualogously. The
"residuals" e,.; and e,; are defined implicitly. Let the sample covariance matrices of g~;
and g,; be denoted as ~~ and ~, respectively. These are consistent estimates of 4i~ and
~,. The estimate of 4' is
~ - N ~~f N ~, (A.5)
N~ N,
In finite samples the variance covariance matrix of g is then approximated by ~' -
N~ - N ~c ~ N~~,.
Using the notation of Section 7, cf. (7.6), let W-[XI,y], ~-(B',a4)' then 4'' is an
estimate of the variance covariance of the error in the regression:
NZ'r- NT.'4V~terror (A.6)15
I:fficient ~~sLimat,ion amounts to GLS in this equa.tiou. Let rzw - plimNZ'W. Then
I,he asymptotic variance covariance matrix of the estimator of ~ is:
avar(m) - (Eáw~-~~zw)-~ (A.7)
In finite samples the vaziance covariance of the estimator of ~ is approximated by
var(~) - (NW~Z(N~~~ t N~~,)-~NZ'W]-' (A.8)
Thns, Lh~~ compnt.ation of the efficient IV estimates amounts to the following proce-
ilure. I~irst csti~nxte cyuatiun (7.G) by IV asaun~iug a scalar varíancc cuvariancc tuatrix
of the errors. Next form per observation the residual vector times the instrument vector
(cf. (A.3) and (A.4)). Multiply these by N~ or N„ depending on which subsample the
observation belongs to. Compute the sample covariance matrices of these vectors per
subsample, i.e. compute ~~ and ~,. Next form ~' - N~, cÏ. (A.5). Use this result to
pcrforni CI,S on (A.6), i.e. compnte:
~ - { ~W'Z~-' ~ Z'W }-' NW'Z~-' N Z'z (A.9)
The variance covariance matrix of this estimator is then computed as
var(~) - { ~W'Z~-' N Z'W }-' (A.10)16
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